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Abstract
With regard to the economic consequences of substantial measures directed at the
conservation of natural resources, such as a substantial energylCOz tax, the discussion
is most often limited to the determination of the economic costs. These costs
are
recognized as the effects the implementation of such measures has on the traditional
goals of economic policy such as GDP, the level of employment, and the distribution
of income. In this article we argue, however, that the economic consequences
should
rather be dealt with in a more comprehensive way including both economic costs
and
economic benefits. For this reason we introduce the economic significance concept.
The term 'economic significance' consists of three (nested) levels. First, it contains
the traditional economic costs. This level is called the distributional issue.
Second,
by incorporating technology the distributional issue is surrounded by the structural
issue. In this way possible economic benefits of substantial natural
resource-saving
measures at the supply-side of the economy are distinguished. The third
level,
surrounding both the structural and the distributional issue, is labelled the iristituti-
onal issue. At this level the focus is on the role of institutions toward both the
other
hvo issues.
In this article we will illustrate the economic significance concept from a
substantial
energy~CO,-tax based on both the CO, emissions in kg~GJ per energy carrier and the
price of renewable energy. Concerning the economic significance of this tax
the
reimbursement of the revenues is important. We direct attention to the return of these
revenues to the economy by means of RBr.D and investment subsidies. We argue that
the introduction of the energylCO~-tax on the one hand and the reimbursement of
the
tax revenues by means of Rc4~D and investment subsidies on the other hand change
the selection environment for the process of technical change. This
concerns both the
adaptation of energy efficiency improvements by individua] firms and the
change of
the energy supply system from a system based on fossil energy carriers to one
based
on renew~ables. In principle, the institutiona] issues that have to be taken
into account
when dealing with the implementation of the energylCOz-tax cannot
be defined
exactly. Nevertheless, however, the proposals on fossil energy taxation as they
have





Ecologically sustainable development requires a reduction of fossil energy use
combined with the increasing application of renewable energy sources. In order to
accomplish the transition process from fossil energy to renewables, adequate stocks
of fossil energy reserves are needed (Biesiot and Mulder, 1994; Noorman et al.,
1996).' These stocks have to be extracted from present production and consumption
processes. There is therefore a strong need for fossil energy conservation, a need that
is strengthened even further if one takes the environmental problems associated with
fossil energy use into account as well. This in particular concerns problems related to
COz emissions. Anthropogenic CO~ emissions are considered to give rise to nearly
half of the 'enhanced greenhouse effect' contributing to global climate change. Since
the Industrial Revolution the atmospheric concentration of COz has increased from
about 280 ppmv to approximately 355 ppmv in 1990. About 80~Io of this increase has
been caused by the combustion of fossil energy (Mulder, 1995).
To bring about the necessar}' conservation of fossil energy, or fossil energy saving,
three types of instruments can be deployed: regulatory instruments, economic
instruments, and persuasive instruments. Although toward natural resources in general
the first type of instrument is still used most in international policy, the ideas about
the most adequate policy strategy have changed considerably over the last ]0-15
years (Van den Bergh, 1996). Consequently, the interest in economic instruments has
grown rapidly. in particular for reasons of efficiency (see e.g. Bohm and Russel
(]985), Baumol and Oates (1988), Pearce and Turner (1990), Cumberland (1994),
Fankhauser (1995)). In addition, other potential merits of economic instruments
include effectiveness and flexibility (Van den Bergh, 1996). Although these are
powerful aspects, some authors have pointed out some disadvantages of economic
instruments as well (see e.g. Dietz and Van der Straaten (1992), Cumberland (1994),
Van den Bergh (1996)).
In the field of fossil energy saving, taxes, subsidies, and tradable permits appear to
be the most relevant economic instruments. Against subsidies, however, various
authors have raised some rather severe objections (see e.g. Siebert (1987), Baumol
and Oates (1988), Bovenberg (1993)). Moreover, so far the concept of tradable
permits has in practice been limited to emissions (Von Weizs~cker and Jesinghaus,
1992). In this article we therefore consider taxes the most adequate instrument
toward curbing fossil energy use. This is because in our view the need for consider-
ably lower COZ emissions is a major reason for stressing the necessity to
conserve
fossil energy rather than a goal in its own right.
The notion that large amounts of non-renewable fossil energy are
needed to accomplish a transition to
a societv based on renew~able, non-fossil energ~ has alread~ been
mentioned b}~ Georgescu-Roegen.
'B~ usi~ig these resources too quickl~, man throtirs ax~a~ that part
of solar etierg~ that ti~ ill still be
reaching the earth for a long time after he has depaned' (Georgescu-Roegen.
1971: 2] ).
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In (neoclassical) economic modelling taxes on fossil energy are generally considered
'distortions' incurring costs (Repetto et al., 1992; Ekins, 1995). Their economic
consequences are therefore regarded as negative. In a neoclassical context the
introduction of a'distortionary' tax on fossi] energy only leads to a worsening
economic performance in period t-1 compared to the base period t-0 in which it is
assumed that no distortions exist. However, the base period cannot be considered as
such due to factors like negative externalities arising from the excessive use of fossil
energy among other things. Therefore, taxes on fossil energy should not be regarded
as a distortion; they rather correct one (Pearce, 1991).
This article addresses the economic significance of a substantial energylCOZ tax for
the Netherlands under the assumption that the revenues of the tax are reimbursed by
means of RBLD and investment subsidies. On the basis of this overall objective three
research questions can be formulated: 1)What is meant by 'a substantial energylCO~
tax'?, 2)What is meant by 'economic significance'? 3)What is the economic signifi-
cance of the substantial energylCO, tax for the Netherlands when its revenues are
reimbursed bv means of R~D and investment subsidies? Section 2 briefly deals with
the first research question. Next, Section 3 addresses the economic significance
concept in 3.1. This section then proceeds to explore the economic significance of
the energylCO, tax in terms of what are called "the structural issue" and "the
institutional issue" successively. Section 4, finally, contains some conclusions.
2. Fossil energy taxation
In essence. at least from a welfare economics point of view, a tax on fossil energy is
supposed to correct the negative externalities resulting from its use. Perfect insight in
the damage caused by fossil energy use, in the context of this article related to the
emission of CO,, is therefore indispensable. The generated knowledge about this
damaQe must subsequently be expressed in market prices. In this way it becomes
possible to express the damage in S per ton of carbon (the IPCC estimates the
marginal damage of a doubling of CO, concentrations at ~5-~ 125 per ton of carbon
emitted nov~. (IPCC, 1996)). This way of reasoning may be theoretically correct; it
can be doubted, however, whether the damage from CO, emissions can seriously be
expressed in monetary terms (cf. Dietz and Van der Straaten (1992), Fankhauser
(1995)). Hence, rather than to base a fossil energy tax level on damage estimates, it
may be more useful to determine it according to other considerations, for instance
ecological. This in fact implies the determination of a CO, emission target at which
the chances on the occurrence of drastic consequences of global climate chance are
minimized. Such an approach most often stresses the necessity of substantial reduc-
tions in CO, emissions. To make such reductions a tax level of ~ 100-~400 per ton of
carbon is generally proposed, see for instance Broero et al. (1991) as quoted in Ekins
(1995: 293). However, this approach is not very satisfactor}~ either, since the relation
between the emission of CO, and global climate change is still subject to fundamen-
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tal questions. We therefore propose another way of determining an adequate fossil
energy tax level (the energylCOz tax hereafter) in this article. In doing so we start
from the two major reasons for energy conservation discussed in the previous
section: 1) the stock of fossil fuel reserves necessary for the transition process from
fossil energy to renewables and 2) the required substantial reduction of CO,
emissions. With regard to the first reason we consider an estimation of the cost price
of renewable energy to be important, towards the second reason we consider
the CO~
emissions per energy carrier of interest.
Based on both the cost price of renewable energy and the CO, emissions
per energy




.pl - (EFi~EFave,t~ ze'.
where
EF, - the CO, emission factor in kg per GJ per energy camer i
EF,,,.,,, - the a~~erage CO. emission factor in kg per G] based on
both total fossil energy use and total CO,
emissions in year t„ '
p~~,~ - the price level of renew~able energ~
For i(,-1990 table 1 shows the ecologically desirable price level per
energy catrier.
We ha~-e calculated the various price levels on the basis of the CO~ emission
factors
in kg~GJ (EF,) shown in the appendix (Nieuwlaar, 1992; Wilting, 1996),
an EF,Ve of
67.4 kgIGJ (Wilting, 1996), and a Pren of Dfl. 15IGJ (Becht, 1989). In
addition, table
1 shows the real price level in 1990 (for an explanation of the real price
level, see
the appendix).
In this article ~~e base the average CO, emission factor EF,,~. on
one year, i.e., t,,. Another possibility is
to base EF,,, on a multi-~~ear period. This might
lead to (slightly) different results as far as the



























From table 1 the level of the energy~CO, tax T per energy carrier i can subsequently
be derived as follows:
Formula 2
Ecologically desirable price leve]
in Dfl.~GJ
Ti - ( (P~,.99c-Pr,199a~ ~Pz.199C~ ' 100
w here
P, ,~,,,, - the ecolo~icall}~ desirable price level in 1990 per energy carrier i
P~ 14Y1 - the real price le~el in 1990 per energy carrier i
For the various energy carriers table 2 then shows the level of the energylCO, tax.
Table 2


















3. The economic significance of the energy~co2 tax for The Netherlands
3.l Introduction
Before we go into the economic significance of the energy~CO~ tax for the Nether-
lands on the basis of what we call the economic significance concept, we first want
to make the following assumptions toward this tax explicit. First, corresponding to
the introduction of the tax in the Netherlands, a similar energy~C02 tax is introduced
in the other countries of the European Union. Second, the tax is introduced gradually.
Its end-level is reached around 2015. Third, in the early part of the introduction route
a relatively small part of the tax is effectuated. In this way we expect the possibilities
for strategic adaptation processes at the level of the individual firm to be maximized.
Toward the reimbursement of the tax revenues we further assume the following.
Based on the use of fossil energy in the Netherlands in 1990, total gross tax revenues
will be about Dfl. 24 billion. These proceeds have to be corrected for the leve] of
fossil energy conservation realized through the introduction of the tax, however. Our
target is for the tax to reduce energy use from the 1990 level of 150 GJ~per capita,
derived from total energy use corrected for the balance of energy imports and
exports, to 105 GJlper capita in 2015.~ This means a reduction of about 30~Io in
2015 compared to 1990. As a result, total net proceeds can be estimated at approxi-
mately Dfl. 17 billion. In contrast to the currently common view that these revenues
can be used to reduce distortionary taxes on labor, see for instance Bovenberg
(1994), we suppose in this article that they are reimbursed by means of RBzD and
investment subsidies directed at fossil energy saving. Although as a stand-alone
policy instrument such subsidies are in general considered rather ineffective in
promoting RB~D and investment in natural resource-saving technologies (see for
example Vermeulen (] 992), Kemp (1995)), a combination with taxes might lead to a
much better result, compare Kemp (1995).
3.2 The ecortomic sigrtificance concept
The economic significance concept used in this article was first introduced in the
SCAN project (Kamminga et al., 1995; Moll and Biesiot, 1995).4 In this concept the
This seems to be a reasonable intermediate goal in the process of realizing a
situation in the second
half of the next century in which energy is completely supplied through
renewable sources and
requirements from a viewpoint of both intra- and inter-generational equity
(in terms of the access to
the energy services needed to satisfy at a comfortable level the requirements
for food, housing,
lightin~. transportation etc.) are met as well. Such a situation may be
characterized by an annua]
enerev use of about 50 GJ~per capita. In this respect, see for instance Mulder
(1995).
The full name of the SCAN project is: 'Analysis of the social
significance, acceptability, and
feasibility of long-term ]ow-energy~ow-CO, scenarios for The Netherlands'.
The project was executed
as part of the Dutch National Research Program on Global Air Pollution
and Climate Change.
6
underlying idea is that substantial measures directed at the conservation of natural
resources5, such as the energylCO~ tax described above, might have both negative
and positive economic consequences. This strongly depends on the institutional
context and the extent to which this context can be changed. Three nested economic
sigr~ificance levels are therefore distinguished. The first level addresses the distorti-
onary impact of a measure on the economy. In this respect, one can think of possibly
negative consequences on traditional goals of economic policy such as an equitable
distribution of income, full employment, and economic growth. This negative
economic impact can be compensated for, however, if we consider some countervai]-
ing considerations. In the case of the energylCOZ tax such considerations include the
reimbursement of the tax revenues and technical change, among other things,
compare Ekins (1995). The explicit recognition of factors like these lead to the
second economic significance level. At this level the central element is 'technical
change'. Through the introduction of a substantia] measure aimed at natural resource
conservation, technical change can be stimulated by which the production structure
changes in a natural resource-saving direction. Finally, at the third economic
significance level it is recognized that toward the other two levels institutional
adaptations are involved or required. 'Institutional change' is therefore the central
element at this level. Figure 1 shows the three economic significance levels.
In this respect, natura] resources both encompass all kinds of renewable and non-renewable
materials
that can be won from nature (plants. animals, minerals and fossil energy) and present
buffering natural
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Figure 1 The three economic significance
levels: the distributional issue, the structural
issue, and the institutional issue [Kamminga
et al., 1995]
In this figure the first level is called the distributional issue, the second the structural
issue, and the third the institutional issue. In relation to the economic significance of
the energy~CO~ tax for the Netherlands, we will first discuss the structural issue in
section 3.3. Subsequently, we will address the institutional issue in section 3.4. In
this article we will not go into the distributional issue explicitly, although this issue
will be considered in the context of the institutional issue in section 3.4.
3.3 The ecoi~onzic sigiiificaizce of the erzer~~'~CO, ta.x- for the Netlzerlands: the
structur-al issue
At the level of the structural issue the process of technical change on the supply side
of the Dutch economy is addressed.
The supply side of the Dutch economy is characterized by a huge emphasis on very
energy-intensive parts of the agro-industrial complex, on the both capital- and
energy-intensive processing industry, and on international commercial services which
are getting more and more energy-intensive, see for instance Van Zanden and
Griffiths (1989), Centraal Plan Bureau (1992). Over the 1970-1988 period five
economic sectors, that is, chemical (basic products) industry, basic metal industry,
freight transport, greenhouse horticulture, and food and stimulant industry, accounted
for approximately 45~7c of direct energy use in the Netherlands (Kamminga et al.,
1995). O~~er the same period their direct contribution to the Dutch economic
perform-
ance in terms of GDP and level of employment amounted to 13-149c (Kamminga et
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al., 1995). With respect to these last figures it should be explicitly recognized,
however, that a large part of the other sectors in the Dutch economy, such as trade,
banking, insurance and business services, is complementary to the agro-industrial
complex and the processing industry. It must therefore be concluded that
the
economic importance of the five energy-intensive sectors mentioned above is much
higher than the direct contribution in terms of GDP and employment suggests.
Because of the huge emphasis on fossil energy-intensive
types of industry,
sustainable development requires a rather radical adaptation of
the Dutch economy.
Such an adaptation is also an economic necessity, however. The
fact is, it is often
argued that the economic prospects of both the agro-industrial
complex and the
processing industry are not very bright, see for example Centraal
Plan Bureau (1992).
Their different kinds of products have above all rather
low prices which causes
Dutch export to be extremely vulnerable to international
competition. In the long run
this does not look good, especially with regard to
competition from low-wages
countries.
In the adaptation process of the Dutch economy an
important role is played by
technical change. Roughly speaking, technical change consists of two
stages.b In the
first stage the focus is on research and development. During
this stage the entire
process of technical change starts with scientific and technical
research. The main
purpose of this research is the accomplishment of inventions. Some
of these inven-
tions are subsequently further developed until the moment
that they are ready for
market introduction. Then the second stage can be reached, the
stage of innovation
and diffusion. Innovation implies the first commercial application
of a new technol-
oay - whether it is a new product, a new process, or even a new
system, whereas
diffusion refers to its adaptation and its use over time.
The revenues of the energy~CO, tax described in section
2 can well be used to
stimulate both stages of the process of technical change.
The technical energy
conservation potentials from De Beer et al. (1994) can illustrate
this. Based on these
potentials, energy use in the Netherlands can be reduced by more
than SO~Io in 2015
compared to 1990 through improvements in energy efficiency
under the assumption
that both production structures and consumption patterns remain
unchanged (Wilting,
1996). However. this does not take into account the
effects of the growth of the
Gross Domestic Product, the volume of private consumption,
imports, exports, and
population. Following the various annual growth rates as
presented in the European
Renaissance scenario of the Dutch Central Planning Bureau
(Centraal Plar Bureau,
1992), the improvements in energy efficiency will reduce
energy use per capita by
approximately 149c in 2015 compared to 1990. This implies a
reduction from 150
GJ~per capita to 129 GJlper capita. On the one hand, this
should be considered the
Deri~~ed from Kemp et al. (1994). Kemp et al.
distinguish two phases in each of these two stages; i.e..
four phases in total.
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maximum reduction that is achievable when all the efficiency improvements sug-
gested by De Beer et al. (1994) are implemented. Conversely, it is the minimal
potential since new technologies may arise within the next twenty years.
The energylCO, tax and the reimbursement of its revenues through RBzD and
investment subsidies can contribute to both the implementation of the presently
known technical potential for energy conservation and the research aimed at the
development of new technologies.' Its substantial level and the destination of the
proceeds imply a significant change of the selection environment of both firms which
are to adopt innovations and firms which aim at the invention and development of
new technologies. The selection environment in this respect comprises the entire set
of actors, structures, and institutions influencing the selection process (Mol, 1991).
Economic factors are among its important dimensions, see also for instance Nelson
and Winter (1982).
In the case of innovation and diffusion, it is often observed that although at current
energy prices many energy efficiency improving techniques are already economically
profitable, they are hardly applied in Dutch industry. From the point of view of the
individual firm important economic reasons for this lagging level of penetration
include (Van der Werff and Opschoor, 1992; Gillissen et al., 1995)
lo~~~ energy costs, both absolutely and relatively
operating cost,
uncertainty about future energy prices, and
a lack of capital.
as a percentage of total
Of these three reasons the second loses its importance to a certain degree since one
of the main characteristics of the energylC02 tax as described in this article is its
Qradual introduction until 2015. Moreover, the introduction route is clearly defined.
So, low energy costs and a lack of capital remain the most important economic
barriers for investments in already existing and economically profitable technologies
aimed at improving energy efficiency. By means of the energylC02 tax subsidy
scheme energy costs are substantially raised, however. Additionally, the investment
subsidies resulting from it can provide a substantial part of the amounts of capital
necessary for undertaking energy efficiency improving investments. As a conse-
quence, investment patterns may be changed significantly in Dutch industry in favor
of the last type of investments.
In terms of both ecological and economic significance, the reimbursement of the tax
revenues through R~D subsidies is even more interesting and more important, in
It is stressed expressl} that here we onl}~ pay attention to economic factors influencing research and
de~elopment activities, inno~~ation, and diffusion. Furthermore, also other factors, such as a lack of
kno~ ledge and the existing institutional infrastructure, influence these kind of economic initiatives.
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particular in the longer run. If in the Netherlands one speaks of a lagging level of
technical change compared to other western industrial countries, this conclusion is
most commonly based on the measurement of RBzD expenditures as a percentage of
Gross Domestic Product. Expressed in this way the Netherlands have lost ground
over the last I 5-20 years, see Lundgren (1995). In combination with the moderate
economic prospects of the two main pillars of the Dutch economy, the agro-industrial
complex and the processing industry, this is a rather alarming development. One way
to reverse this development might be through RBtD subsidies financed by means of
the revenues from the energy~C02 tax. Since these subsidies are directly connected to
higher fossil energy prices, RBzD efforts may not only be directed at energy effi-
ciency improvement on the demand side but also at the energy supply system which
at present is almost entirely based on fossil energy carriers such as coal, oil, and
natural gas. Through the tax-subsidy scheme an intensification of the search for and
the development of types as well as applications of renewable energy sources can be
expected. Examples of such sources in particular include wind energy, solar energy,
and biomass. Obviously, this is interesting from an ecological point of view, since
sustainable development explicitly requires a switch from fossil energy carriers to
renewables. Moreover, in an economic sense this also clearly offers what can be
called ,first moi~er adi~antages. These advantages result partly from the transformation
process of the energy supply system from the present system based on fossil energy
carriers to one based on renewable sources of energy. In addition, and perhaps more
important, the fundamental switch of the energy supply system can lead to a funda-
mental change on the energy demand side. Thus, a new technological paradigm may
occur from which a need for a whole range of new equipment arises (for a short
description of the technological paradigm concept, see Dosi and Nelson (1994)). In
this respect, one should not only think of technical equipment but also of organiz-
ational and institutional tools. In this way we argue that there is no one-sided
influence of the selectio~i en~~ironmerlt on the process of technical change. On the
contrary, the process of technical change significantly influences the selection envi-
ronment too.
3.4 The econoniic significance of the energ~~~CO, tax for the Netherlaftds: the
irtstitutiorial issi~e
In principle, it is not possible to define exactly the institutional issues which have to
be taken into account when dealing with the implementation of a energy1C02 tax as
described above. This is in particular caused by the fact that we do not have any
experience with the implementation of such a tax. It can be taken for sure, however,
that many unexpected and unpredictable reactions of relevant actors will take place
during the implementation period. This does not imply, however, that we do not have
any insights into the complexities of the problem. In the proposals on fossil energy
taxation as they have been presented in the Netherlands previously, two potential
frictions can be recognized. First, there is the point of the collection of the tax as
such. Normally speaking, the collection of taxes is the responsibility of the Minister
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of Finance; one should not overlook the point that the revenues of taxes are not
given back to citizens or businesses. This implies that there is a substantial institu-
tional problem when energy taxes are proposed. Furthermore, there is the reaction of
economic actors not willing to be confronted with higher prices of their inputs. Both
problems were recognized in the Netherlands when some years ago similar proposals
were done. The discussion of the controversies resulting from these proposals can
provide us insight into the relevant institutional complexities.
When the Minster of Environmental intended to present to Parliament the National
F,nvironmental Policy Plan at the end of the eighties, a central question was how the
NEPP should be financed. The NEPP is partly financed by the government and partly
by producers and consumers. Indeed, the greatest part of the plan is financed by
producers and consumers, so the amount of money to be spent by the government is
not high. Nevertheless, in a situation in which it is political common sense to reduce
the influence of the government and to reduce the budget of the state, such an
amount is difficult to realize. In line with the historical development a great part of
the money needed was found in an increase in the levy on fuel. But it was imposs-
ible to get all the money from this source, as this would have caused an increase in
the cost price of all industries using a lot of energy. This would have had a negative
effect on the volume of exports. So, other sources to finance the plan were necessary.
In the beginning it was not clear how this could be arranged. But the idea of a more
important role of a system of levies brought the top of the ministries of Economic
Affairs and of Finance to a revolt (Aarden en Van Venetië, 19 January 1989). A
second reason for this revolt is found in the assumed macro-economic aspects of
these measures. All levies would result in higher costs for exporting industries and
would increase the collective burden, as a percentage of GNP. Neither of those
effects were desired. This opinion is based on political priorities as well as on old-
fashioned economic paradigms which give priority to certain economic variables such
as the export position and the level of income and profits, and which neglect the
economic relevance of environmental problems. This strong opposition to the finan-
cial aspects of the NEPP in the top of certain ministries hampered the publication of
the plan. In the meantime environmental economists became aware of this contro-
vers}~. The}~ were afraid that the NEPP would be killed before it was born. They sent
an open letter to Prime Minister Lubbers and plead for the implementation of
financia] instruments. They were of the opinion that a sound environmental policy
was more important from an economic point of view at this moment than the
financial deficit of the state, the collective burden or the purchasing power of the
population (Anonymous, 21 March 1989). This letter received a lot of attention in the
media, but the political process was going on in the ministries and in the cabinet.
In the cabinet Lubbers-II the controversy about the financial aspects was present too.
The Minister of Economic Affairs and the Minister of Finance were of the opinion
that the collective burden could not be increased and that an increase in expenses of
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the state, financing the plan, should be compensated by a decrease in expenditures
elsewhere (Anonymous, 11 April 1989). But the balloons went elsewhere. There was
a proposal, which was accepted in the cabinet, to abolish the standard tax reduction
for commuting costs and to increase the taxes for house-owners. In the beginning
thcre were no problems about these proposals in Parliament. But the grassroots
support of the right wing liberal party were dead against these measures. An increase
in the levy on fuel, the abolishment of tax reductions for house-owners and com-
muters was too much for a party of which the majority of the members and voters
live in suburban green areas, commuting to their working places in the cities by car
and in most cases with a house of their own. The result was that this party came into
difficulties, as the Minister of Environmental Affairs and the Minister of Transport,
being members of the same liberal party, were politically responsible for the NEPP.
Especially the Minister of Environment was a great advocate of this plan, including
the implementation of important levies with the aim to reduce polluting emissions by
creating a higher price for these activities (Van Roessel and Van Venetië, 27 April
1989).
It became clearer that the right wing liberal party would not accept the proposed
implementation of the financial instruments and that the Minister of Environmental
Affairs and those of Transport would draw a lucky number to the NEPP (Aarden, 1
Ma}~ 1989). The Organization of Dutch Employers supported the party in its resis-
tance a~ainst the plan. They were of the opinion that this environmental problem was
worth the fa11 of the government (Anonymous, 1 May 1989). The result could be
predicted, indeed, the fall of the government (Aarden, 3 May 1989). Due to the fact
that the Ministers of Environment and Transport were the great advocates of the
NEPP, their position in the party became untenable. Some weeks after the govern-
ment's fall the NEPP was presented in Parliament. There were elections and a new
cabinet was composed. The new coalition partner of the Christian Democrats was the
Social Democratic Party. The new Minister of Environmental Affairs is a member of
this party.~ The NEPP became the starting point of this new cabinet: Lubbers-III.
Later on a revised version of the NEPP was accepted by Parliament: the NEPP-Plus.
This version contains hardly any new elements.
This political struggle makes it clear that a substantial rise in revenues from environ-
mental measures can cause many political difficulties, due to the fact that these
measures are always accompanied by shifts in power in the state machinery, while,
additionally, these measures have distributional effects. Furthermore, the arguments
It is often assumed, that Social Democratic Parties are better for the environment than others. The
histor~~ of the NEPP does not confirm these ideas, as the Ministers of Environmenta] Affairs, preparing
the NEPP were members of the right wing liberal party and belonged to the best advocates of the
implementation of a sound environmental policy. The role of the Social Democratic Party and the
present social democratic Minister of Environmental Affairs can be derived from the way the minister
is portra~-ed in a popular Dutch TV program. which is a kind of Dutch version of the British program
Spitting Image.
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used are strongly related to traditional neoclassical theory, in which attention is only
given to the production factors labor and capital. Even though the production factor
natural resources is given some theoretical attention, one may say that neoclassical
economic theory in reality deals with labor and capital. Many economic textbooks fill
their pages with labor, capital and markets. It may be clear that this is a result of the
use of an economic system which has its roots in the last century and which does not
have sufficient categories to describe and sufficiently analyze environmental prob-
lems.
One should be aware that these theoretical contemplations have everything to do with
environmenta] politics. The production factors labor and capital could 'solve' their
controversies by shifting their problems to the environment (and in many cases they
are still going on with this process). They can use their position in the state machin-
ery to realize this process. They have used the last hundred years to arrogate the state
machinery and important sections of society. The economic importance of the
production factor natural resources is hardly recognized and, more importantly, this
production factor does not have any political power in the state machinery itself,
compared with the production factors labor and capital. It is the environmental
groups which have, in some cases, had the countervailing power put pressure on the
government (Van der Straaten, 1990). The coherence between traditional economic
theory, the balance of power in society, and em~ironmental politics is the main cause
of the relatively weak results of the Dutch attempts to implement strict environmental
norms and to tax environmentally unfriendly economic activities.
Furthermore, the evaluation of the Dutch policy with regard to the reduction of the
enhanced greenhouse effect can provide us with new insights into the institutional
frictions in this policy field. The enhanced greenhouse effect as such has been known
for many decades. However, the Dutch government did not pay attention to this
phenomenon until the publication of the previously mentioned National Environ-
mental Polic}' Plan of 1989 (Minister of Housing, Regional Development and the
Environment et al.. 1989). This plan is aimed at levelling off carbon dioxide
emissions: in the year 2000 the emissions should be at the same level as in 19891-
1990; in a later plan, the NEPP-Plus, it was stated that a 3-5 per cent reduction of
emissions has to be reached in the year 2000 taking 1990 as a basis. Before 1989,
the enhanced greenhouse effect was not an issue in the Netherlands. This can be
demonstrated by the negotiations at the end of the 1980s regarding the reduction of
the nitrogen oxide emissions by motor cars, the Netherlands advocated the introduc-
tion of a catalytic converter which would increase the use of gasoline by ]0 per cent.
This implies that such a converter would increase the enhanced greenhouse effect.
Another option, the lean-burnt engine, would result in a mild reduction of acidifying
substances, but in a considerable reduction of the emission of carbon dioxide (Dietz,
Van der Straaten and Van der Velde, 1990). This option was not given serious
attention.
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As was stated previously, the enhanced greenhouse effect is mainly caused by the use
of fossil fuels. Some fuels such as natural gas has a lower percentage of carbon than
coal. Thus, the substitution of resources can result in a lower emission of carbon
dioxide. The most significant contribution to lowering emissions can be obtained by
using less energy. This implies that the actors involved be those sectors having a
high consumption of energy. As has been stated the enhanced greenhouse effect is a
global problem. The Dutch sectors responsible for the emissions can be treated
without paying attention to these global problems. All emitting sectors are in the
same position. They have to lower their consumption of energy.
In this policy area, there was one topic which was the focus of attention after 1989,
namely the introduction of an energy tax. It was argued that the current price of
energy was too low. This low price resulted in a relatively high consumption of
energy. The implementation of an energy tax was seen as an instrument bringing
prices to a more appropriate level.
Debate began in earnest in 1991 when it became clear that the Minister of Environ-
mental Affairs intended to increase the levies on energy consumption. In 1991, the
total amount of this levy was 1 billion guilders, and the intention was to increase the
levies to 2.5 billion guilders in 1995. These levies were seen as a source of revenue
for the Ministry of the Environment. Employer organizations and the large corpor-
ations were against such an increase. They were afraid that there would be a strong
tendency to increase these levies every year (Marieke Aarden, 19 September 1991).
However. this levy was r.ot considered as a regulating levy in order to lower energy
consumption. The aim of the levy was to finance the Ministry of the Environment.
The increase in the price of energy was sharply criticized by seven international com-
panies which were large consumers of energy such as AKZO, Shel] and DSM. These
companies wrote a letter to the Minister of Economic Affairs in which they stated
that they would shift their investments to other countries in the case of an increase in
the price of energy. The right wing liberal party sided with these companies (Anony-
mous. 23 September 1991). However, some points were not given sufficient atten-
tion. In the first place, it has always been the intention of the Dutch government to
implement an energy tax in cooperation with the other European countries. In the
second place, the prices of energy for industrial purposes were the lowest in Europe
as can be concluded from figure 2(Leo Hauben, 19 October 1991).
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Figure 2 Industrial Energy Prices; the Netherlands compared ~~ 'h five other Euro-
pean countries (derived from Hauben, 1991)
Gasprijs in centen per m' - Gas price in cents per m3;
Prijs electra in halve centen per kWh - Price of electricity in 0.5 cents per kWh;
NL - the Netherlands; F- France; B- Belgium; UK - United Kingdom; D-
Germany; I - Italy
The Minister of Environmental Affairs established the Wolfson Commission which
included a number of ~vell-known Dutch economists. The Minister argued that
companies workina in an international market would probably be exempted from an
energy tax (Anonymous, 22 October 1991). In Parliament most parties argued that
the concentration of a tax on energy would not be the best way of dealing with
environmental problems. It would be better to introduce a tax on the use of all
natural resources including manure, groundwater and heavy metals (Anonymous, 23
October 1991).
At the request of the Wolfson Commission the Central Planning Bureau investigated
the effects of the implementation of an energy tax accompanied by a decrease in the
taxes on labor. The argument was that a shift of taxes away from the abundant
production factor labor in the direction of the use of natural resources would result in
a better system of state financing, more in accordance with the relative scarcity of
production factors. Several scenarios were calculated by the Central Planning Bureau.
It was concluded that in the most favorable scenario the effects on employment
would be neutral. In a scenario in which only the Netherlands implemented an energy
tax there would be a negative influence on employment figures (Harko van der
Hende. 28 January 1992).
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These calculations by the Central Planning Bureau were used as an argument by the
Minister of Economic Affairs who claimed that these results were so negative that he
was dead against the implementation of any energy tax. In Parliament, there was
little appreciation on the part of most parties for the opinions of the Minister of
Economic Affairs. They argued that the Minister should have waited until the
publication of the Wolfson Commission report. Some environmental groups said that,
from the political point of view, this behavior on the part of a minister was unaccept-
able. Of course, the international Dutch companies used the opinion of the Minister
of Economic Affairs as a support of their case (Anonymous, 31 January 1992).
The Wolfson Commission came to the conclusion that the Cabinet was divided on
the implementation of an energy tax. Therefore, they refused to continue their work
(Anonymous, 1 February 1992). During a discussion with the Cabinet the commis-
sion decided to publish their results in due time. These results lead to many contro-
versies. The assumptions in the model the Central Plan Bureau used were criticized
by many environmental groups. However, it can be said that the publication of the
opinion of the Minister of Economic Affairs before the publication of the report had
changed the political climate in such a way, that from the political perspective these
publications could be neglected. The implementation of an energy tax had become,
by the Minister's statements a political non-issue (Marieke Aarden and Harko van
der Hende, 20 February 1992). The influence of the seven international companies
mentioned previously have had sufficient effect on the political debate that an energy
tax could no longer be realized in the Cabinet and in Parliament (Marieke Aarden
and Harko van der Hende, 18 February 1992).
After the publication of the report of the Wolfson Commission report and the
resulting political debate no plans were developed to implement a substantial energy
tax. One of the most significant instruments which could be used to reduce energy
consumption had become a non-issue in the Netherlands.
4. Conclusions
Through both the introduction of a substantial energy~C02 tax and the reimbursement
of the tax revenues by means of RBrD and investment subsidies, the selection
environment for the process of technical change changes. First, this concerns the
adaptation of innovations toward energy efficiency improvements by individual firms.
Second, in terms of research and development this concerns the change of the energy
supply system from a system based on fossil energy, the present situation, to one
based on renewables. This may lead to a change of the technological paradigm which
in turn will considerably influence the energy demand side in terms of technical
equipment and organizational and institutional tools. This not only produces a
substantial ecological result (the ecological significance) but also contributes to the
required economic renewal of the supply side of the Dutch economy.
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One important remaining question is, however, whether it is reasonable to assume
that the channelling of the tax revenues to RBzD and investment subsidies will
exhaust the entire revenue. If not, how should the remaining revenues then be
returned to the economy?
Regarding the institutional aspects the following conclusions can be drawn:
~ New social and institutional arrangements have been realized. However, as soon as
environmental problems with the additional distributional effects came up for
discussion it became clear that the traditional arrangements where distributional
conflicts are normally discussed at the political level did not play a significant role.
Additionally, the new anangements were not appropriate to solve these distribu-
tional problems. This resulted in a clear position in which energy taxes could not
be implemented
~ The behavior of actors clearly demonstrated that they were all aware of the
shrinking possibilities to use the environment as a sink. Furthermore, they used
these limitations to confront other actors with distributional conflicts.
~ In the 1980s the environmental awareness of the population and Parliament went
hand in hand. In the nineties this was no longer the case. Parliament gave more
attention to traditional economic problems. The fall of the Cabinet-Lubbers II
clearly demonstrated that traditional economic issues were given a higher profile.
~ New institutions and arrangements did not fulfil a sufficient strong role to make
the implementation of an energy tax possible. It can not be seen how this can be
realized in the future.
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Explanation of the real price level in 1990 in Df1.IGJ:
(the used conversions in GJ are all derived from (Koninklijke PBNA BV, 1987: 817))
Coal: 1 ton - 29.31 GJ.
In 1990 the price of coal amounted to Df7. 98~ton (Albers et al.,
] 993: l 1).
Coal products: 1 ton - 28.05 GJ (cokes).
Based on the 1990 price of coal of Dfl. 98lton the price of coal
products has been determined as follows: 98~(1.248~1.097). The
latter term reflects the energy needed for the conversion from coal to
cokes (Nieuwlaar, 1992: 10). This conversion is supposed to be fully
effectuated through the use of coal.
Mineral oil: 1 ton - 41.87 GJ.
In 1990 the price of crude mineral oil amounted to Dfl. 302~ton
(Albers et al., 1993: 11).
Mineral oil products: 1 ton - 41.78 GJ (gas-,diesel- and light fuel oil).
Based on the 1990 price of mineral oil of Dfl. 302~ton the price of
mineral oil products has been determined as follows: 302~(1.121I1.0-
37). The latter term reflects the energy needed for the conversion
from mineral oil to mineral oi] products, including distribution
(Nieuwlaar, 1992: 10). This conversion is supposed to be fully
effectuated through the use of mineral oil.
Natural gas: 1000 m~ - 31.65 GJ
In 1990 the Gasunie sold 40.3 billion m~ natural gas in the Nether-
lands. The corresponding price amounted to Dfl. 9.6 billion (Gas-
unie, 1990: 10,11,40). The average price was therefore Dfl. 0.23821-
m' or Dfl. 7.53IGJ.
Electricit}': 1 MWh - 3.6 GJ
In 1990 the average price of electricity amounted to Dfl. 0.084IkWh
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